* enjoy the
convenience of their
Revolving Line/s of Credit
(often not paying for Purchases for up to 55 days
after receipt of goods and services); and
* Noted that
".....
In addition, many credit card
holders take advantage of interest-free periods such that they do not
pay interest on their card balances
" identified by the RBA as
Transactors.
"The
Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 also gives the RBA
extensive powers
"....to
gather information from payment system participants and operators."
* the Reserve Bank has
significantly greater powers/responsibilities to "...the economic prosperity
and welfare of the people of Australia",
than the Bank of England
or the
U.S. Federal Reserve has
to the economic prosperity and welfare
of the U.K. and U.S. citizens respectively.
* (2) It is the
duty of the Reserve Bank Board, within the limits of its powers, to ensure that
the monetary and banking policy of
the Bank is directed to the greatest
advantage of the people of Australia and that the powers of the Bank under
this Act and any other Act, other than the Payment Systems (Regulation)
Act 1998, the Payment Systems and Netting Act
1998and Part 7.3 of the
Corporations Act 2001,
are exercised in such a manner as, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank Board,
will best contribute to:
(a) the
stability of the currency of Australia;
(b) the
maintenance of full employment in Australia; and
(c)
the
economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia.
* RBA's key areas of focus included
capacity for richer information with payments.
* "On current scheduling the New
Payments Platform will deliver a fast payments service
with rich information
and addressing capabilities in the second half of 2017.
"Before 1981, activities of major Australian
banks, including the manner they dealt with
customers, were
subject to detailed regulations imposed by the Federal Government. Following the 1981
Campbell
Committee Report, banking regulations were significantly reduced."
* Request
to the Reserve
Bank of Australia, hereinafter the RBA, to
implement the same
"competitiveness and efficiency"
that it has overseen in the 'wholesale supply side' of the debit and credit cards products to the
Retail Supply Side of
credit cards, because banks profits from credit cards are not derived
from the User Pays Principle
*
All users should pay the cost of their credit card
transactions, and not some "unlucky" users paying a disproportionate burden
which has further gapped the "Haves" from the "Have Nots"
A) "gather
information from payment system participants and operators"
by proceeding to obtain datafor a
particular month (or quarter)
from over 70 issuers
for the
330 different
types of cards that are available which shows:
1. Number of cards
that repaid total indebtedness and aggregate dollar amount of those
repayments.
2. Number of cards
that repaid > or =50% of total indebtedness and aggregate dollar amount of those
> or = 50% repayments.
3. Number of cards
that repaid<50% but >5% of total indebtedness and aggregate dollar amount of
those <50% but >5% repayments.
4. Number of cards
that repaid <=5% of total indebtedness and aggregate dollar amount of those <=5%
repayments;
10. In order to test the
Writer'scalculations listed at
(A), (B) and (C) in this 1st Question, it would be necessary for the Royal
Commission to request Australia's largest six or seven
Credit Card Issuers,
that included Citibank and Latitude Financial,
to provide Credit Card data over at
least 12 months that lists the -
Next, I would like to
discuss data and transparency.
We welcome the
Commission’s strong focus on data and harnessing new technologies to
facilitate consumer understanding.
ASIC, like the
Productivity Commission, supports the proposed open banking regime. With
appropriate regulatory settings, increasing consumers’ access to their
own data has the potential to empower decision making and stimulate
competition and innovation within the financial services sector.
The Commission
has made a number of other specific recommendations on data."
Data from the household, income and
labour dynamics survey in Australia (HILDA), the household expenditure survey
and the survey of housing and income shows households in the lowest income
quintile have more credit card debt relative to their incomes and pay more in
credit card interest relative to their incomes than higher income households,
though overall differences in interest payments between quintiles are small
(Figure 1).1
These surveys also show households in
the bottom two quintiles by net worth also pay the most in credit card interest
relative to their income (Figure 2).
(A.)
LOAN
RATE STICKINESS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE - RBA 1992 (by
Philip Lowe and Thomas Rohling) informed that the
Reserve Bank regulated lending interest rates until
1985 and post-deregulation lending interest rates,
in particular Credit Card interest rates, did not
fall in line with the
Overnight Cash Rate, and when falls were
passed on, it wasn't done quickly or completely,
whereas when the Overnight Cash Rate increased, these
increases were passed on by way of higher lending
interest rate and more quickly. Hence, Credit
Card interest rates were particularly
stickywhentheOvernight Cash Ratefell, as
Credit Card interest rates regularly remained 'stuck'
at their existing interest rate.
"From 1966, when personal loans were introduced, the maximum rate
that banks could charge was set by the Reserve Bank. Once again, in
April 1985, the controls were removed.
At the same time, the maximum interest rate that could be charged on credit cards was
deregulated. Prior to this time the maximum rate had been set at 18 per cent per
annum.
As detailed above, most lending rate ceilings were lifted in
April 1985.
For the housing, credit cards and personal
loan rates, the ranking in terms of the degree of stickiness is maintained.
Even after nine lags are included the sum of the coefficients on all three
of these rates remain significantly less than one. The same is true for
the standard overdraft rate.
In contrast,
the rates on personal loans and credit cards do not appear to be
more flexible in the deregulated period."
4.
36 years ago when the
Campbell Committee
recommendations were being implemented, the prospect of a
Royal Commission
into
ostensibly
Unconscionable
Conduct within the
'financial services sector'
would have been
viewed as implausible to
those Australians that lived through the lengthy regulated interest rate epoch
in Australia's financial history, because
-
(i)
the Reserve Bank
and its predecessor the then Govt. owned, Commonwealth Bank, had increasingly
regulated 'with an iron fist in a velvet glove'
the commercial banks since 1911 as chronicled in Chapter 17;
and
(ii) historically when de-regulation
resulted in adverse consequences, re-regulation
by Australia's 'central bank' ensued.
Between 1960 and
1980 the Reserve Bank diligently regulated commercial Australian bank interest
rates relying on, inter alia, Section 50
of the
Banking Act 1959.
5.
Chapter 5
mathematical calculates/quantifies the circa financial burden upon
Revolvers and includes
the following:
Below is an extract fromConsumer Affairs Victoria
- Regulating the cost of creditwhich evidences that in
the past if de-regulation did not achieve the desired results, then re-regulation
followed. But not with regard to re-introducing a max interest rate cap on
Credit Cards, notwithstanding
that -
"The tide of utilitarianism rose
slowly, and a lengthy campaign was necessary before the financial
deregulation of 1854, which abolished the British interest rate cap.
However, one act of deregulation cannot quell an argument that has been going on for millennia. Over the following century the tide gradually turned towards re-regulation, culminating with detailed requirements imposed on the financial sector (particularly the banks) during and immediately after the Second World War.
We now trace the
gradual lead-up to this second phase of regulation."
"Obviously this is a pretty radical
act, and it will be fought," he replied. "But I think the American people
are disgusted with the financial industry. They want change.
You could argue that an interest rate of 15% or 18% is more than enough to
accommodate any amount of risk on the lender's part.
If a loan appears
riskier than that, don't make it. What we have to ask as a nation is
whether it's ethical to charge people 30% interest rates," Sanders said.
"This is loan sharking. Let's call it what it is."
"determine rules for participation in a payment
system and set Standards for safety and efficiency, incl. issues such as
performance benchmarks"
by proceeding to implement
"cost-based benchmarks"
[akin to (I.), (II.) and (III.)
in Section 2 [of this letter to the RBA] by -
(a) setting
a regulatory cap for all
the
330 different types of cards which fall under the jurisdiction of the
RBA of -
i) 850 basis
points above the RBA official interest rateas the maximum annual on-going
interest rate charged by Credit Card Issuers in Australia for Purchases, where Credit Card Issuers can reach, but not exceed, this Purchase Interest Rate Cap;
ii) 950 basis points above the RBA official interest rate as the maximum
annual on-going interest rate charged by Credit Card Issuers in Australia for
Cash Advances, where Credit Card Issuers can reach, but not exceed, this Cash Advance Interest Rate Cap - refer
50% cap on Cash Advances in D) below;"
*
iterate the reasons why our primary financial services regulator, Australia's 'central
bank' regulated
interest rates 'with
an iron fist in a velvet glove'
over Australia's commercial banks until Campbell; and
"Looking back in time, Australian banks collapsed in almost every
decade of the 19th century. In 1893 after the failure of
fraudulent land banks in Victoria triggered a wholesale run on
banks. In the space of six weeks, 12 banks closed their doors. Those
banks accounted for two-thirds of the total banking assets in
Australia.
That crisis increased pressure - which had been building for some
time - for the formation of a central bank. The Commonwealth Bank
was formed by the Federal Government in 1911 to issue notes which
would be backed by the resources of the nation.
Banking became more tightly controlled during World War II, with the
central bank dictating overdraft rates and, later, statutory reserve
deposit ratios and liquid asset ratios.
To avoid a patent conflict of interest, the Commonwealth Bank's
'central banking powers' were transferred to the newly formed
Reserve Bank of Australia in 1959."
The below four quotes from "Overview
of Financial Services Post-Deregulation"by (Dr) Diana
Beal, Director, Centre for Australian Financial Institutions, University of
Southern Queensland,
evidence that the Reserve Bank
rigorously regulated bank deposit rates until 1980 when restrictions on interest rates
were dismantled after adopting Campbell Committee recommendations:
"Interest-rate
ceilings on deposit accounts restricted the banks’ ability to attract funds
particularly during the 1970s when inflation was rampant. In the June
quarter of 1975, inflation rose to 16.9% pa. At the same time, interest
payable on amounts held in savings accounts offered by savings banks, for
example, was restricted to 3.75% from 1969 to 1980 (Foster, 1996). In contrast, the
interest rates offered by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) were not
controlled and they were able to pay around 10% on passbook accounts."
"Banks in 1980 still operated in a highly regulated environment which was an
artefact of previous economic and social conditions. Indeed, an extensive
collection of controls remained from regulation introduced under the
National Security Regulations in 1941."
"Interest rate ceilings on trading bank and savings bank deposits were
dismantled from 1980; some limits on minimum and maximum terms on fixed
deposits remained."
"The maximum interest rate payable on small
balances in savings accounts was fixed by regulation at 3.75% from 1969
to 1980."
8
.
Below is a quotation from Westpac's submission to the
Wallis
Inquiry
1997
by the then CEO, Bob Joss:
Writer's investigations suggest that the
Wallis Inquiry
1997 did not adopt
Westpac's prudent recommendation for on-going monitoring of any changes in
interest rates in either its
Discussion Paper- Released Nov 1996
or Final Report- Released March 1997.
"Regulation of all markets for goods and services can be
categorised according to three broad purposes.
First, regulation is to help
ensure that markets work efficiently and
competitively, and thus to overcome
sources of market failure.
Second, regulation can prescribe particular
standards or qualities of service, especially where the consumption of goods
and services carries risks, so that safety is a focus of concern.
Third, regulation can
help achieve social objectives such as, for example, 'community service obligations' which typically take the form of price controls."
11.
The U.S. has set the precedent. The interest rate charged for the
majority of Credit Cards issued in the USA is based on an agreed margin above
the U.S.
Prime Rate.
Many credit cards base their
variable interest rates on the
prime rate. A variable interest rate is one that changes based
on another interest rate.
For example, the APR on a credit card might be the prime rate plus
13%. The interest rate your credit card issuer charges on top of the
prime rate is known as the "spread." In our example, the
"spread" is 13%. If the prime rate is 3.25%, the current APR on that
variable rate card would be 16.25%. That means the prime rate has a
direct, but typically small, impact on the
finance charges you pay on your
credit card when you carry a balance. The higher the prime rate, the
more you'll pay to revolve a credit card balance. You can avoid
paying any interest at all by paying your credit card balance in
full each month.
If your credit card has a variable interest rate based on the prime
rate, your credit card interest rate will follow the movement of
the prime rate.
If the prime rate goes up, you can expect your credit card interest
rate will soon go up. On the other hand, if the prime rate goes
down, your credit card interest rate should go down.
Credit card issuers don’t have to give advance notice of interest
rate changes if you have a variable interest rate.
"The aim should be to reduce bank profits
to one per cent or less as a share of GDP, the level they were at two decades ago.
Other policy changes that would contribute to this aim include:
•
legislating to ensure
that interest rates charged by banks move in line with changes to the RBA cash rate and are set and advertised as
a mark-up over the cash rate
• restricting the
interest rates that can be charged on unsecured credit to levels that reflect the underlying risk to the lender.
⎕ Section 5 explains how
real people, rather than the consumers of economic theory, make financial decisions, and
how banks exploit human nature in their approaches to marketing.
The paper concludes that the
high degree of concentration in the
banking market and the huge profits it generates are inevitable in a
deregulated banking system such as Australia’s. With consumers powerless to change
corporate behaviour and new entrants unable to compete on a level playing field, the
big four banks are relatively free to gouge as much money from the Australian
economy as they are able. Better regulation in banking is urgently needed."
"Reform of credit card
schemes will also have a direct impact on credit cardholders and is likely to
result in some re-pricing of credit card payment services. However, this
is the means by which the price mechanism is to be given greater rein in the credit
card market. A movement towards a “user pays” approach to credit card
payment services would be consistent with the approach adopted by Australian
financial
institutions in pricing other payment instruments under their control. As the ABA itself has
confirmed: “Pricing services efficiently provides consumers with choice to use lower cost
distribution channels and, therefore, facilitates a more efficient financial
system. It is also fairer and efficient, because consumers only pay for what they use.”
* Point 5 under Supporting Evidence
re 1st Question;
and
* Point 7 under Supporting Evidence
re 3rd
Question (shortly below).
5.
Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Aust: "A Consultation Document" – Dec 2001evidences that Reserve
Bank
advocated (on page 116) a
movement
".....towards a
'user pays' approach to credit
card payment services
would be consistent with the approach adopted by Australian financial institutions in pricing
other payment instruments under their control”which
never crystallised perhaps because the Four Pillars exerted
pressure as evident in the below extract from
Son of Campbell ... byGlenda Korporaal,
The Australian,
Hockey vividly remembers one day in the early 1990s
when he was a junior adviser to then NSW finance minister George Souris. The
minister received a visit from the chiefs of the big four banks, who were
opposed to plans to introduce a financial institutions duty. "The four chief
executives came in to bully," Hockey says. "There was Bob Joss [Westpac],
Don Argus [National Australia Bank], David Murray [Commonwealth Bank] and
Don Mercer [ANZ]. They came in - just the four of them - to belt up this
minister. I was his adviser. There were only six of us in the
room.
"I well remember their attitude and I thought to
myself: Well, it is good to provide the respect, but it is also the case
that they are in it for themselves and their banks - as they should be. But
I am in it for the community."
"B) determine rules for participation in a payment
system and set Standards for safety and efficiency, incl. issues such as
performance benchmarks"
by proceeding to implement
"cost-based benchmarks"
[akin to (I.), (II.) and (III.)
in Section 2 [of this letter to the RBA] by -
(a)
iii) $90 for the
maximum Annual Credit Card Fee that a Credit Card Issuer can charge
(in 1993 restrictions on annual fees for credit
cards were removed, so it is not unreasonable to introduce a cap,
particularly as some cards charge inordinately high annual fees to provide
'inter alia' high loyalty points which surprisingly avoid income and FBT
taxes. Why should a Credit Cardholder be entitled to claim as a tax
deduction an annual fee of $395 to then earn 3 points for every dollar spent
and not pay income tax on that earning?)
(b)
learning from point 1. of CBA's research in Section 4, set an 'Access Regime'
that each credit card issued in Australia to a person who has
not previously owned a credit card be a Provisional Charge Card,
hereinafter PCC, with a conservative credit limit where the owner of the
PCC is required for the initial 12 months to repay the
outstanding balance on the PCC in full by the due date (9 days from the Issue
Date and 7 days from the normal receipt date for postal delivery) or be subject to severe late fees and restrictions on future
PCC use,
with
deferment of receiving a traditional Credit Card until the PCC owner complies with the PCC
repayment obligations for 12 months without breach.
C) reduce the non-interest period from 'up to 55 days' to 'up to 42 days' to reduce the cost burden on
Credit Card Issuers
because electronic payments enable Credit Card Users to pay their monthly
repayments within a few days of notification of the final monthly balance.
D) continue to sanction the market practice of not providing a non interest period
for Cash Advances, but restrict the limit for Cash Advances to 50% of the
total credit limit because as Wikipedia explains - * "a
credit card is a small plastic card issued to users
as
a system of payment"; and
* the original cards
"required
the entire bill to be paid with each statement".
E) increase the
minimum repayment required from 2.5% to 25% of the outstanding debit balance
which shouldn't faze over >60% of credit card owners and will materially reduce the
interest burden on the remaining <40%.
F) allow Credit Card Issuers to levy -
a) an explicit 'Lost Card Fee' for -
* placing a stop on an account; and/or
* issuing a replacement credit card(s) commensurate with the cost to the Credit Card Issuers of
issuing a replacement credit card(s); and
b) a 'Fraud Provision Fee' upon each
credit card user each month based on the quantum of transactions and the
outstanding undrawn indebtedness (eg. for a credit card user with a $5,000
credit limit, who made 10 purchases in a month, with an outstanding undrawn
balance of $3,000 (vulnerable to fraudulent access) the 'Fraud Provision Fee'
for that month would be say 10 @ 0.15c = $1.50 + say $3,000 @ 0.0003c = $0.90 for a total monthly
'Fraud Provision Fee' of $2.40 for enjoying the convenience of using a
credit card
for 10 transactions with a $5,000 credit limit.
G) establish a
uniform credit evaluation methodology that all Credit Card Issuers must
observe similar to NAB's Microenterprise Loans because to many Australian adults are obtaining credit cards
with excessive interest rates which would be lower if the defaults were lower
due to a robust standard credit analysis methodology.
H) prosecute the
case on behalf of the "unlucky" Australians with
Baycorp Advantage'et al'and the Credit Card Issuers to establish and
regulate protocols and systems so"unlucky" Australianscannot obtain
between 6 and 10 credit cards, as evidenced by Tony Devlin, Head
Financial Counsellor,
Salvation Army's Moneycare service, in Section 4 above."
* Chapter Five: 'Philosophy of Financial Regulation'
"Third, regulation can help achieve social
objectives such as, for example, 'community service obligations' which
typically
take the form of price controls."
* Chapter Nine: 'Stability and Payments'
"There is scope for increased competition in the payments system which will help
to lower its costs of operation. However, this must be balanced against
the need to maintain stability in the financial system. The payments system provides one central
way in which instability can be generated. The RBA should retain overall
responsibility for the stability of the financial system, the provision of
emergency liquidity assistance and for regulating the payments system."
* Chapter Eleven: Promoting Increased Efficiency
"Cross-subsidies are derived from
historical product bundling [evident in (a) to (g) of
Chapter 3 above], earlier
difficulties with apportioning costs, and community expectations that
institutions should meet community service obligations. The unwinding of
such cross-subsidies can increase efficiency in the financial system."
9.
Reserve Bank webpage
Credit Cards Regulatory Decisionsevidences that the Reserve Bank, the
legislative appointed protector
of Credit
Cardholders, did naught for theRetail Supply Sideprior to March 2014.
Will the Royal Commission
recommend that the Governor of the Reserve Bank
draw upon its
existing powers to replace the debt 'lure' of anInterest Free Periodwith
a
-
Former Qld Premier, and
now Australian Bankers Association chief executive, Anna
Bligh, has been chartered with lifting the credibility of 'inter alia'
Credit Card Issuers,
after her predecessors, David Bell and the long running, Steven
Münchenberg, facilitated bank greed involving Unconscionable Conduct.
(A). informs that
the current CEO of the ABA, Anna Bligh, announced in late Dec 2017 that the ABA
had just lodged a 'Banking Code of Practice' with the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) for approval; and
(B). lists several changes that will be legally binding on all 'member banks' of the
ABA which includes:
"Customers only paying interest on what remains on a credit card and not the full
amount of purchase if a loan is being paid down."
Hence, the ABA has ruled it mandatory that its members desist
(A) above. The Writer has validated that St. George Bank has so ceased
this practice because the St. George Credit Cardholder referred to in
Example 1of
Labyrinth of ‘Concealed Spiders’checked with St.
George Bank.
When
Dr. Edey was questioned before the
Senate Economics Legislation Committee
regarding a dearth of competition in Credit Card interest rates when the
Overnight Cash Rate is at an
all-time low of 1.5%, Dr. Edey responded:
"...
we do not have an interest rate regulator in
Australia............... What we do have is
an ACCC that can investigate uncompetitive conduct if they see it, but they
clearly have not seen it in this market".
Will the Royal Commission ask the Governor of the Reserve Bank
why the former Assistant Commissioner, Dr. Malcolm Edey,
made the below comments
on 1 June 2015 that resiled the RBA's obligations and responsibilities to ".....promoting competition in the market for payment services,
.....", pursuant to -
How could a very senior representative of the
RBA with over 20 years experience working for the RBA not know that the RBA
shouldered all of the ACCC's obligations re ensuring competition from 23 Feb 2004? It
defies belief for Dr. Edey to have responded
"What we do have is
an ACCC that can investigate uncompetitive conduct if they see it, but they
clearly have not seen it in this market".
The above extract from an address by Dr. Malcolm Edey (RBA) contradicts the
below indented extracts fromReserve Bank of
Australia Bulletin - July 1998 - Australia’s New Financial
Regulatory Frameworkthat chronicles the Reserve Bank's powers, set out in the
Payment Systems
(Regulation) Act 1998,
that allow the Reserve Bank
to undertake more direct regulation of ‘designated’ payments systems
to "... promote
competition in the market for payments services, consistent with the overall
stability of the financial system..." when it judges it to be
"in the public interest" whichmay involve the imposition
of access rules or operating standards for participants in such systems:
"The new Payments
System Board is responsible for the Bank’s payments system policy, the
objectives of which are:
•
controlling risk in the financial system arising from the operation of the
payments system;
•
promoting the efficiency of payments systems; and
• promoting
competition in the market for payments services, consistent with the overall
stability of the financial system.
The Bank’s powers in this area, set out in the
Payment Systems
(Regulation) Act 1998,
allow it to undertake more direct regulation of ‘designated’ payments systems
when it judges it to be in the public interest. This may involve the imposition
of access rules or operating standards for participants in such systems. The Act
also provides a framework for regulation of purchased payment facilities, such
as travellers cheques and stored-value cards."
The Reserve Bank's
publicationPayment, clearing and settlement systems in
Australia - 2011 includes the following
extract that would have allowed
the RBA at any time to determine if a particular cohort of Credit Cardholders,
namely those with poor Financial Literacy Capacity, were being Unconscionably
burdened with paying the costs of Credit Card Issuers' providing
Revolving
Line/s of Credit to Transactors,
frequently -
"1.8 Dr Edey quite
rightly made the point that Australia does not
regulate interest rates, and, as such, there is no
interest rate regulator. He told
the committee that Australia does have 'an ACCC [Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission] that can investigate uncompetitive conduct if they see it,
but they clearly have not seen it in this market'.3
It
was put to Dr Edey that the issue was not so much whether there was
uncompetitive conduct in the market, but whether regulatory settings were
conducive to the promotion of sufficient competition to put downward pressure on
credit card interest rates.4
In part,
the committee's inquiry has been directed at understanding whether existing
regulatory settings in relation to credit cards are appropriate in this respect. More broadly, the committee has sought to determine what might be done to
improve competition in the credit card market or otherwise put downward pressure
on credit card interest rates."
Will the Royal Commission ask the Governor of the Reserve Bank
if he agrees with Dr. Malcolm Edey's
below responses to the
Senate 'Economics Reference Committee', because it is contrary to the findings in
LOAN RATE STICKINESS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE in June 1992
and empirical evidence in the USA, the UK and Australia over the subsequent 26 years:
"Dr Edey: Yes, the
financial system works through competition. The
basic wholesale interest rate is the cash rate,
which we set, and then competitive forces will
cause other interest rates to move up and down
with the cash rate. That is the way the effect
of policy is transmitted to the wider economy."
=================================================
Supporting Evidence re 7th Question
1.
Extracts from the Reserve Bank Research
Discussion Paper
titledLOAN
RATE STICKINESS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE - RBA 1992
(by Philip Lowe and Thomas Rohling)
dated June 1992informed that the
Reserve Bank regulated lending interest rates until
1985 and post-deregulation lending interest rates,
in particular Credit Card interest rates, did not
fall in line with the
Overnight Cash Rate, and when falls were
passed on, it wasn't done quickly or completely,
whereas when the Overnight Cash Rate increased, these
increases were passed on by way of higher lending
interest rate and quickly. Hence, Credit
Card interest rates were particularly
sticky
when the Overnight Cash Rate
fell, as
Credit Card interest rates regularly remained 'stuck'.
'Up like a rocket, down like a feather':
Credit cards and the RBA cash rate
3.6 Professor Valadkhani (Department
of Accounting, Economics and Law, Swinburne University of Technology)
provided the committee with research he had undertaken indicating that
credit passed on 112 per cent of RBA cash rate increases (the full value
of increases, plus 12 per cent), but only 53.7 per cent of rate cuts: but
cuts were delayed by an average of two-and-a-half months. Professor
Valadkhani has suggested this asymmetry is an example of the
'rockets-and-feathers' effect: credit card interest rates 'shoot up like a
rocket' in response to RBA cash rate increases, but 'float down like
feather' when the cash rate is decreased.4
This means that over time the gap
between the RBA cash rate and credit card interest rates has grown, and
consumers have been left paying higher rates of interest overall.
3.7 Professor Valadkhani took issue with the
banks tendency to downplay the relevance of the cash rate to credit card
interest rates:
"We do
not have enough information about what their funding sources are. The
argument they always make is: 'We cannot pass rate cuts on because our
sources of funding are different—it is not just the cash rate; it is our
external sources.' My argument to banks is: if that is the case, how
come, when the cash rate goes up, you immediately lift your rates? You
may have other external sources that are not related to the cash rate,
but you increase your rates anyway. When the cash rate goes down,
though, you resort to the argument of external sources.5"
3.8 CHOICE noted that despite a falling cash
rate, average credit card interest rates had gone up for both standard-rate
and low-rate cards in recent years. This was of particular concern to
CHOICE, because:
…if
you must have a credit card and you are on a low income that means you
cannot pay off your balance every month, a low-rate card is the best
option. So to see banks taking advantage of drops in interest rates to
dip their hands deeper into the pockets of low-income consumers is of
deep concern.6
Credit card
interest rates have been unresponsive to movements in the cash rate
"Despite a 2.75 percentage point decline in the cash rate since late 2011,
credit card interest rates have remained high. The rates on ‘standard’ cards are
currently around 20 per cent, while the rates on ‘low-rate’ cards are around 13
per cent (Figure 3). This has prompted concern that there is a lack of
competition in the Australian credit card market."
"We will also be clear in
the Statements of Expectations that regulators should explain in each
annual report how they have balanced competition with other elements of
their mandates."
Will the Royal Commission ask the Governor of the Reserve Bank
if he agrees the logic in Dr. Malcolm Edey's
below verbal exchange with the Acting Chair of the
Senate 'Economics Reference Committee'
on 1 June 2017, because
there is Welter Of Evidence
that -
*
some Credit Card Issuers, notably Citibank, offer Zero Balance Credit Cards (to
other bank Credit Cardholders) that consolidate (other bank)
Credit Cardholders cumulative debts; and
*
Zero Balance Credit Cards are profitable because they target other bank Credit
Cardholders with poor Financial Literacy Capacity,
Dr Edey: We often
get asked that question. I have heard that
question put a lot in relation to mortgage
interest rates, because there was a period of
time, particularly during the GFC, where
mortgage rates were not moving one for one with
the cash rate as well. The response that we have
always given to that is that the cash rate is a
still a significant driver of those rates, so it
is still having an influence. We take into
account movements in the margins between those
rates in determining what the appropriate level
of the cash rate is. In principle, the same is
true for the credit card rates. Referring back
to what I said earlier, the amount of credit
card debt and interest is much smaller than is
the case for mortgages and for business loans,
so it is not—
ACTING
CHAIR:
I can understand why from the perspective of a
bank, and the Reserve Bank's perspective, it is
smaller in terms of overall impact for the
economy. But it is fair to say that for the
people who are caught in things like debt traps
and who are caught with credit card debt—and
they may be small numbers—it is quite
significant isn't it?
Dr Edey: It is
significant for the people who are paying it.
But it is just not particularly big for the
economy as a whole.
Another thing that has been
going on over the last couple of years is that
there are interest-free cards, or low-interest
cards, that you can get by being prepared to
switch if you are on a standard credit card
rate. Increasingly, people have been doing that,
or they have been paying off their loans more
quickly so that they do not incur interest.
ACTING
CHAIR:
Hang on. That is a furphy of an argument. The
point is, and you just agreed to this a minute
ago: the gap is at a record high for low-rate
cards as well as high-rate cards. For all cards,
it is at a record level, isn't it? It is not as
if I can go to a low-rate card and I will be
okay. Even for the low-rate cards, the gap
between that and the cash rate has now reached a
record level.
Dr Edey: That gap
has gone up as well.
But there are also
zero-rate cards. The banks do offer switching
packages where you can get an interest-free card
if you switch banks.
Mr
Campbell: For a few
months.
Dr Edey: For
limited periods. What I am saying is that there
are ways you can take advantage of the
competition that is there to reduce your
interest.
ACTING
CHAIR:
I just want to be very clear, Dr Edey, on what
you are saying. I want to be able to walk away
from this and get a good understanding. The
point you seem to have been making is this—and I
want to put this together; tell me if this is
incorrect. Firstly, what you are saying, from
the evidence that you seem to be presenting,
does question some of the assertions that have
been made as to why the gap is so high. The
point you seem to be making is:
'Yes, we are
talking'—and you are going to get us the exact
figures, but the default rates are quite small;
the non-performance rate is quite small. We want
to get to the bottom of how and why the gap
between credit card rates and the cash rate has
reached a record level. We are asking you, Dr
Edey, whether it is something the Reserve Bank
is prepared to look at, and it seems to be that
the answer you are giving us is, 'No.'
Dr Edey: No, I am
not saying 'No' at all.
All I am really saying
is: somebody should look at it, and I think that
we should consult with our colleagues in other
agencies to determine who is the best placed to
lead it.
"Amid mounting evidence of bank
gouging on credit cards,
Australia’s corporate watchdogs are failing to protect consumers.
Dr Edey’s comments during the hearing
also highlighted fundamental flaws in the way banks and other
financial institutions are regulated in this country.
The truly big revelation in Dr Edey’s comments to parliament was
that no regulator in the country has recently seen fit to
investigate the gaping margin between credit card costs and the
prices at which they are sold.
In
response to questions from Labor senator Sam Dastyari and
independent senator Nick Xenophon, Dr Edey acknowledged that it was
an important issue that should be examined by a regulator, but he
wasn’t sure which one.
This
raises another issue, namely the failure of the
Council of
Financial Regulators – which the Reserve Bank coordinates – to
identify credit card pricing as an area worthy of inspection by
regulators.
The RBA and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority have the
power to access sensitive data on the banks’ credit card businesses
and even though a persuasive case already exists that price gouging
is occurring, no regulator has fired a salvo.
If the Council was doing its job
properly the knowledge of the banking regulators would have already
been shared with the competition watchdogs – the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission.
The fact
that it hasn’t underlines a major flaw in the current regulatory
framework.
That probably has a lot to do with the
RBA’s co-ordinating role in the Council’s work and the central bank’s alarming
indifference towards competition as a policy concern.
If part of the RBA’s mandate is to protect the welfare of
Australians in its execution of monetary policy, the Governor’s
commentary on credit cards pricing is a fail."
Mr. Byres also agreed
with Treasury, the RBA, and the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission officials that there ought to be closer scrutiny of the interest
rates banks are charging on their credit cards, because the current "spread"
between the official cash rate and rates charged on credit cards was at
record levels.
"I understand the point fully that the margins on credit card business
look very high, certainly to any other form of credit, and certainly I
can't sit here today with an explanation of why that is," Mr Byres said.
"Informing us all about that is probably a useful piece of work."
Post the
APRA
Chairman's above
undertaking almost three years ago, to
· The
institutional responsibility in the financial system for supporting
competition is loosely shared across APRA, the RBA, ASIC and the ACCC. In a
system where all are somewhat responsible, it is inevitable that (at
important times) none are.
Rather, we
need: regulatory settings that do not thwart competition between existing
institutions; more customer-oriented providers that consider their existing
customers (not just potential new customers);
less of a blizzard of new
but barely-distinguishable products with labels that obfuscate; much
better and far more open information on product prices and conditions; and
scope for consumers to more easily become unstuck (should they wish to be)
from their current banks and insurers.
The
financial system needs a competition champion
Competition in Australia’s financial system is without a champion among the
existing regulators — no government agency is tasked with overseeing and
promoting competition in financial markets, including forcing consideration
of whether actions by regulators materially harm competition. Under
the current regulatory architecture, promoting competition
requires a
serious rethink about how the RBA, APRA and ASIC consider competition and
whether the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is
well-placed to do more than it currently can for competition in the
financial system.
As a forum for coordinating input
from financial system regulators on regulatory interventions, the CFR should
be a key avenue through which consideration of competition impacts is
promoted, analysed and made more transparent.
Shedding light on regulator decision making
As part of the broader adjustment in
regulatory focus required, greater transparency around decision making by the
financial regulators, including the CFR, is essential to ensure accountability
and an active consideration of effects on competition.
As a first step in this process, and
as a matter of priority for the Government, the Statements of Expectations for
ASIC and APRA need to be updated from their 2014 versions and reported against
annually. Such statements would provide financial regulators with the
Government’s perspective on their strategic direction and most crucially, allow
assessment after the fact to see if performance matched expectations. This draft
report should influence those documents.
The decisions made at the CFR are
profound in their impact on the financial system and the economy but there is no
public transparency around them. Regulation has tended to err on the side of
financial stability. Due to a lack of transparency, it is difficult to establish
whether this approach is justified in all cases.
The
CFR's consideration of competition analysis (and other market interventions)
should be minuted and published, as the RBA Board meetings are.An assessment that analyses in depth
the competition implications of a proposed regulatory intervention should be
discussed at the CFR meeting prior to the intervention starting. Regulators
should, in their Statement of Expectations, be required to consider amending
policies to alleviate adverse impacts on competition."
"Informing us all
about that (the current "spread" between the official cash rate and rates
charged on credit cards was at record levels) is probably a useful piece of
work."
Sadly, that ".....
useful piece of work"
failed to materialise at the quarterly October CFR meeting of
Australia's three statutory appointed regulators.
"In contrast, at around 2–3 per
cent over recent years, write-offs on credit card debt and other personal
lending have been higher, consistent with some portion of this lending being
extended to borrowers with a relatively weak credit profile and on an
unsecured basis. Although credit card and personal lending is riskier, it
represents only a small share of banks’ total domestic loans."
The FSR discussed the following
issues mentioning the word 'competition',
but not about what APRA
Chairman,
Wayne Byres told senators "....is probably a useful piece of
work."
nominal housing price growth
Funding and liquidity
the owner-occupier part of the
mortgage market and in parts of the business lending market.
a further deterioration in banks’ asset
quality in conjunction with slower rates of credit growth and the potential for
net interest margins to narrow if the liberalisation of interest rates increases
price competition for funding.
Household and Business Finances
competition in the owner-occupier
lending market remains strong
price competition for business lending
mortgage
lending insurance
price competition for new and lower-risk
owner-occupier borrowers
competition
for new large corporate loans
cost of banks’ domestic deposit funding
Profitability
competition in the mortgage market and
the housing price cycle
If the Royal Commission wants to
understand why Australia's 'central bank' has never exercised its rights -
These results, when considered together with Australian Bureau of
Statistics‘ research into Australians‘ general document literacy and
numeracy,15in particular
their ability to meet the complex demands of a knowledge-based economy,
suggest that about one in two Australians do not have the skills required to
make informed choices in their interactions with the financial services
sector.16
There is also
an identifiable age link, with document proficiency tending to decrease with
age.
14 For
example the 2008 ANZ study of financial literacy found that ‗67% of
respondents said that they understood the principle of compound interest,
but only 28% were
rated with a good level‘ of comprehension when they solved the problem‘,
ANZ Banking Group Limited,
ANZ survey of adult financial literacy in Australia, (The Social Research Centre) ANZ Banking Group, Melbourne, 2008, p. 19.
15As part of an
international study, the ABS measured skills in document literacy, prose
literacy, numeracy and problem solving and found that approximately 7
million (46%) of Australians (and 7.9 million (53%) of Australians aged 15
to 74) had proficiency less than the minimum required for individuals to
meet the complex demands of everyday life and work emerging in the
knowledge-based economy‘ for document literacy and numeracy respectively‘,
Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Adult literacy and life
skills survey results, cat. no. 4228.0, ABS, Canberra, 2006, p.
5.
16
These findings
have implications for our regulatory regime, which relies upon disclosure as
a critical element of our consumer protection system.
These results, when considered together with Australian Bureau of
Statistics‘ research into Australians‘ general document literacy and
numeracy,15in particular
their ability to meet the complex demands of a knowledge-based economy,
suggest that about one in two Australians do not have the skills required to
make informed choices in their interactions with the financial services
sector.16
There is also
an identifiable age link, with document proficiency tending to decrease with
age.
14 For
example the 2008 ANZ study of financial literacy found that ‗67% of
respondents said that they understood the principle of compound interest,
but only 28% were
rated with a good level‘ of comprehension when they solved the problem‘,
ANZ Banking Group Limited,
ANZ survey of adult financial literacy in Australia, (The Social Research Centre) ANZ Banking Group, Melbourne, 2008, p. 19.
15As part of an
international study, the ABS measured skills in document literacy, prose
literacy, numeracy and problem solving and found that approximately 7
million (46%) of Australians (and 7.9 million (53%) of Australians aged 15
to 74) had proficiency less than the minimum required for individuals to
meet the complex demands of everyday life and work emerging in the
knowledge-based economy‘ for document literacy and numeracy respectively‘,
Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Adult literacy and life
skills survey results, cat. no. 4228.0, ABS, Canberra, 2006, p.
5.
16
These findings
have implications for our regulatory regime, which relies upon disclosure as
a critical element of our consumer protection system.
Senator
XENOPHON:The
amount of credit card debt is $45 billion to $48
billion—$33 billion accrues interest. We are
sort of talking about the numbers of the Rudd
stimulus package in 2009. It is a lot of money
in the economy. What I am trying to understand
is this: you said that the banks say that the
interest rate is greater because of the risk
factor. Has the Reserve Bank tested, in terms of
the default rate for the banks, whether it has
gone up over the years, and that is why the gap
has increased and turned into a chasm? Have you
checked that? That seems to be what the banks
are saying: more risk; therefore higher interest
rates. Has the increase of interest rates, in
relative terms, been due to an increase in
defaults?
Dr Edey:We have
not tried to test that.
Senator
XENOPHON:Shouldn't that be tested though? That is an
underlying assertion on the part of the banks.
Dr Edey: I think
it is well worth somebody's while to test that.
Senator
XENOPHON:Right.
But you could liaise with APRA to get that
information. Is that right?
Dr Edey:I think
so.
Senator
XENOPHON:But does
it concern you, as Senator Dastyari pointed out,
with apologies to Elvis, that in terms of debt
people are caught in a trap and they just cannot
get out of it? Does it concern you that there
are many thousands of Australians who are stuck
in a debt trap because of credit card debt and
very high interest rates, who will not be able
to get on with their lives, will not be able to
get a decent credit rating and will not be able
to get their first home, because of interest
rates that appear to be much higher than a
well-functioning market would dictate.
Dr Edey: I think
it is a problem if people are in that situation.
I do not doubt that there are many people who
struggle with that sort of issue. But you need
to remember that the Reserve Bank has a top-down
systemic risk focus. So if there is enough of
that happening that it is a risk to the system
as a whole, that is our concern.
Senator
XENOPHON:But right now it is a known
unknown. We just do not know how many people
have been deeply affected by credit card debt,
and that itself might point to some systemic
issues.
Dr Edey: I cannot
put a number on how many people there are, but
we know how much debt there is.
Senator
XENOPHON:It would
be desirable to put a number on how many people
are deeply affected by credit card debt, would
it not?
Dr Edey:I am not
sure why quantifying that is an issue for the
Reserve Bank. We know how much debt there is. We
know what the non-performance rates are on
consumer debt. It is only about three per
cent—that sort of magnitude.
"The
Government agrees with the Inquiry’s objective of strengthening the
regulator accountability framework but does not support the creation of
a new Financial Regulator Assessment Board.
We
consider that new requirements in the
Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) and the
Government’s Regulator Performance Framework provide avenues to
strengthen regulator accountability along with other existing mechanisms
such as Parliamentary hearings.
We
will reconstitute the Financial Sector Advisory Council with refreshed
Terms of Reference to include providing advice on the performance of the
financial regulators by the end of 2015.
We
support providing regulators with clearer guidance in Statement of
Expectations and consider that the PGPA Act requirements are consistent
with the Inquiry’s recommendation for increased use of performance
indicators for regulator performance.
We
will update the regulators’ Statements of Expectations in the first half
of 2016, including providing a Statement of Expectations to the Payments
System Board for the first time."
"In contrast, at around 2–3 per
cent over recent years, write-offs on credit card debt and other personal
lending have been higher, consistent with some portion of this lending being
extended to borrowers with a relatively weak credit profile and on an
unsecured basis. Although credit card and personal lending is riskier, it
represents only a small share of banks’ total domestic loans."
contains the following references to the
Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998):
Subdivision D—Administration
16AJ Requiring assistance
(1)
APRA may, by written notice given to any of the following persons, require
the person to give APRA such reasonable assistance in the performance of its
functions, and the exercise of its powers, under this Division as is
specified:
(a) an ADI (whether or not it is a declared ADI);
(b) an administrator appointed under subsection
13A(1) to take control of an ADI’s business;
(c) a liquidator appointed in connection with the
winding up, or proposed winding up, of an ADI.
(2)
Without limiting subsection (1), APRA may require a liquidator to assist
APRA in APRA’s function of paying account holders their entitlements under
Subdivision C.
(3)
For example, APRA may, by notice issued under subsection (1), require the
liquidator to do the things specified in the notice, including:
(a) carrying on the business of the ADI so far as
necessary, or doing any other act or thing, to facilitate APRA’s payment to
account holders in accordance with Subdivision C; or
(b) seeking the re-entry of the ADI into a payment
system (as defined in section 7 of the
Payment Systems (Regulation)
Act 1998); or
(c) transferring the entitlements of account holders
to accounts held by the account holders in another ADI.
The
Banking Act 1959
contains the following references to the
Reserve Bank of Australia, in particular
Part V—Interest
rates
50 'Control of interest rates':
2 Commencement
Except as otherwise provided by this Act, this Act shall come
into operation on the day on which the Reserve Bank Act 1959
comes into operation.
8 Only the Reserve Bank and bodies corporate that are ADIs may
carry on banking business
11C Division not to limit operation of other provisions
Nothing in this Division is intended to limit the operation of
any other provision of this Act or of the Reserve Bank Act 1959.
11CE Supply of information about issue and revocation of
directions
Power to publish notice of directions in Gazette
(1) APRA may publish in the
Gazette notice of any direction made under
Subdivision A or B or section 29. The notice must include the name of the ADI or
authorised NOHC given the direction and a summary of the direction.
Requirement to publish notice of revocation of certain
directions in Gazette
(2) If APRA publishes notice of a direction made under
Subdivision A or B or section 29 and then later revokes the direction, APRA must
publish in the Gazette
notice of that revocation as
soon as practicable after the revocation. Failure to publish notice of the
revocation does not affect the validity of the revocation.
Requirement to provide information about direction to Treasurer
and Reserve Bank
(3) If the Treasurer or the Reserve Bank requests APRA to
provide information about:
(a) any directions under Subdivision A or B or section 29 in
respect of a particular ADI or authorised NOHC; or
(b) any directions made during a specified period under
Subdivision A or B or section 29 in respect of any ADIs or authorised NOHCs;
APRA must comply with the request.
16AE Advice and information for decision on making declaration
(1) The Minister may give APRA, ASIC or the Reserve Bank a
written request for advice or information about a matter relevant to making a
decision about making a declaration under section 16AD (including a matter
relating to the affairs of an ADI).
(2) As soon as reasonably practicable after being given the
request, APRA, ASIC or the Reserve Bank must give the Minister the advice or
information about the matter.
(3) In making the decision, the Minister must take into account
the advice and information (if any) that he or she has been given before making
the decision. This does not limit what the Minister may take into account in
making the decision.
Part V
—Interest
rates
50 Control of interest rates
(1) The Reserve Bank may, with the approval of the Treasurer,
make regulations:
(a) making provision for or in relation to the control of rates
of interest payable to or by ADIs, or to or by other persons in the course of
any banking business carried on by them;
(b) making provision for or in relation to the control of rates
of discount chargeable by ADIs, or by other persons in the course of any banking
business carried on by them;
(c) providing that interest shall not be payable in respect of
an amount deposited with an ADI, or with another person in the course of banking
business carried on by the person, and repayable on demand or after the end of a
period specified in the regulations; and
(d) prescribing penalties, for offences against the regulations,
not exceeding:
(i) if the offender is a natural person—a fine of $5,000; or
(ii) if the offender is a body corporate—a fine of $25,000.
1.
number, indebtedness and demography of the Credit Cardholders (which may include
a husband and wife
collectively) that the
Financial Counsellors are assisting; and
·$10,000 but
less than $20,000 - (eg. 2,556 Credit Cardholders (
individual or couples)
own
10,767 Credit Cards (= 4.2 Credit Cards per person or husband and wife/partner)
across 10 largest
community organisations) ·$20,000
but less than
$50,000 ·$50,000
but less than
$100,000 ·$100,000
but less than
$125,000 ·$125,000
but less than
$150,000 ·$150,000
or higher
Will the Royal Commission ask the
Chairman of the ACCC, Mr. Rod Sims, if the below extracts from 'Conditions
of use' booklets issued by St. George Bank, ANZ and
Westpac with text
in small fonts
constitute
Unconscionable Conduct?
*
St George Bank
"We strongly recommend
that you read this booklet carefully
and retain it for your future reference"
a 76
pages
Conditions of Use - Credit Guide
document of Conditions.
The word 'interest' appears in the 'Contents' twice and 78 more times throughout
the 76 pages. The word 'fee' or 'fees' appears 53 times.
*
ANZ's 'CONDITIONS
OF USE 20.06.2016 CONSUMER CREDIT CARDS'
is a 97 page booklet printed in 9
font. Cardholders
are requested to read voluminous parts of it as well as their Credit Card
Contract. The word "interest' appears 216 times in the booklet. The word 'fee' or
'fees' appears 104 times.
* "Ignite
by Westpac - Consumer Credit Card Conditions of Use". The
word 'interest' appears in the 'Contents' once and 92 more times throughout
the 43 pages. The word 'fee' or 'fees' appears in the
'Contents' once and 74 more times throughout the 43 pages. "This User
Guide forms part of your Credit Card Contract, along with the information
set out on the reverse of your welcome letter which advises you of your credit
limit and other prescribed information we are required to give you by law."
Clause 17 is "Do I have any other rights and obligations?" "Yes.
The law will give you other rights and obligations.
You should also READ YOUR
CONTRACT carefully."
These results, when considered together with Australian Bureau of
Statistics‘ research into Australians‘ general document literacy and
numeracy,15in particular
their ability to meet the complex demands of a knowledge-based economy,
suggest that about one in two Australians do not have the skills required to
make informed choices in their interactions with the financial services
sector.16
There is also
an identifiable age link, with document proficiency tending to decrease with
age.
14 For
example the 2008 ANZ study of financial literacy found that ‗67% of
respondents said that they understood the principle of compound interest,
but only 28% were
rated with a good level‘ of comprehension when they solved the problem‘,
ANZ Banking Group Limited,
ANZ survey of adult financial literacy in Australia, (The Social Research Centre) ANZ Banking Group, Melbourne, 2008, p. 19.
15As part of an
international study, the ABS measured skills in document literacy, prose
literacy, numeracy and problem solving and found that approximately 7
million (46%) of Australians (and 7.9 million (53%) of Australians aged 15
to 74) had proficiency less than the minimum required for individuals to
meet the complex demands of everyday life and work emerging in the
knowledge-based economy‘ for document literacy and numeracy respectively‘,
Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Adult literacy and life
skills survey results, cat. no. 4228.0, ABS, Canberra, 2006, p.
5.
16
These findings
have implications for our regulatory regime, which relies upon disclosure as
a critical element of our consumer protection system.
Will the Royal Commission recommend to the
Three Financial Regulatorsthat they use their existing
regulatory powers to require all Credit Card Issuers to simplify their Credit
Card Products so that their Credit Cards 'Conditions of Use' booklet,
together with any Schedule/s referred to therein, do not exceed 50 pages in text no smaller than Arial 10?
=================================================
Supporting Evidence re 18th Question
*
St George Bank
"We strongly recommend
that you read this booklet carefully
and retain it for your future reference"
a 76
pagesConditions of Use - Credit Guide
document of Conditions.
The word 'interest' appears in the 'Contents' twice and 78 more times throughout
the 76 pages. The word 'fee' or 'fees' appears 53 times.
*
ANZ's 'CONDITIONS
OF USE 20.06.2016 CONSUMER CREDIT CARDS'
is a 97 page booklet printed in 9
font. Cardholders
are requested to read voluminous parts of it as well as their Credit Card
Contract. The word "interest' appears 216 times in the booklet. The word 'fee' or
'fees' appears 104 times.
* "Ignite
by Westpac - Consumer Credit Card Conditions of Use". The
word 'interest' appears in the 'Contents' once and 92 more times throughout
the 43 pages. The word 'fee' or 'fees' appears in the
'Contents' once and 74 more times throughout the 43 pages. "This User
Guide forms part of your Credit Card Contract, along with the information
set out on the reverse of your welcome letter which advises you of your credit
limit and other prescribed information we are required to give you by law."
Clause 17 is "Do I have any other rights and obligations?" "Yes.
The law will give you other rights and obligations.
You should also READ YOUR
CONTRACT carefully."
Does each of the Four Pillars reducing their low interest credit card by
5% circa
in recent months, amidst the prospect of a Royal Commission,
evidence that the Four Pillars that issue 80% of Credit Cards used in
Australia, were uncompetitive during the
Council
of Financial Regulators'watch', when each of the RBA, ASIC and
APRA have regulatory obligations to the australian public
to ensure real competition amongst Credit Card Issuers?
Will the Royal Commission recommend that Reward Programs be banned?
=================================================
Supporting Evidence re 20th Question
Rewards Programs constitute tax evasion because benefits received can be
measured as 'income' or 'cash outlays avoided', but such receipts are not income taxed.
Credit Card Products informs inter alia that the humble means of
obtaining a 'Product' and/or a 'Service' on credit, by presenting a Credit Card
to aMerchant, now
renders those plastic cards to be the most differentiated product in the Western
World for the simple reason of Credit Card Issuers maximising their profits
amidst a diverse range of
Financial Literacy
Capacity
and inadequate laws/regulations.
Credit card reward schemes are mostly a gimmick
unless you're a big spender, since rewards cards
nearly always charge hefty annual fees and high
interest rates.
Credit card reward programs deliver little or
nothing to consumers who don't spend generously via
their credit cards.
A
CHOICE investigation of 63 rewards credit cards
found that consumers would need to spend at least
$2000 a month to get any return, while those who
spent $1000 a month or less
would pay more in annual fees than they got back in
rewards.
Our research has also shown that cards that
reward you with frequent flyer points are a far
better deal than gift card or cash back rewards
cards, where rewards accumulate at a much slower
rate."
"When the benchmarks for credit card interchange
fees were introduced in 2003, the Board’s aim was to
limit the tendency for competition between schemes
to drive up interchange fees. By setting the
benchmarks in weighted average terms, the Bank
allowed schemes significant flexibility to set
different interchange fees for different
transactions, some of which could be over the
benchmark.
Schemes
have taken advantage of this, and of the current
infrequent compliance arrangements, to develop
commercial strategies that encourage issuers to
maximise interchange revenue. The result has been
that actual average interchange fees have tended to
be higher than the regulatory benchmark and have
drifted further above the benchmark between the
three yearly compliance points. Accordingly, the
benchmark has not represented an effective cap on
average interchange fees."
Will the Royal Commission recommend to the
Three Financial Regulatorsthat they use their existing
regulatory powers to ban Credit Card Issuers paying third party credit card
websites such as the following from marketing in any way, shape or form their
Credit Card Products
because such advertisements are often misleading and deceptive and targeted at
Credit Cardholders with low
Financial Literacy Capacityas quantified by the Productivity Commission
and the ABS inChapter
1?
* Request
to the Reserve
Bank of Australia, hereinafter the RBA, to
implement the same
"competitiveness and efficiency"
that it has overseen in the 'wholesale supply side' of the debit and credit cards products to the
Retail Supply Side of
credit cards, because banks profits from credit cards are not derived
from the User Pays Principle
*
All users should pay the cost of their credit card
transactions, and not some "unlucky" users paying a disproportionate burden
which has further gapped the "Haves" from the "Have Nots"
Below is an extract from Section 1 titled
'Summary of eight Attachments' of
(i) entrusted to be
banker and financial agent for the Commonwealth; and
(ii) with a charter to protect
"
....the
economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia".
if
CreditCards.com(parent site ofaustralia.creditcards.com)
is being paid by some
or all ofOur
Bank/Issuer Partners(ANZ, Aussie, Bank Mecu, Bankwest, citi, NAB, St George, Virgin, Westpac)
for providing links to those banks' websites credit card products at
,
because some like NAB's Low Interest Credit Card, Bank mecu's Low Interest Rate
Credit Cardand
Bankwest'sBreeze MasterCardare patently deceptive.
2. The only party that should make
representations about the respective benefits, or costs, of a Credit Card, which
is a material financial 'borrowing instrument' available to Australian's with
poor Financial Literacy
Capacity, should be the Credit Card Issuer. Removing the above
'web platform sellers' should reduce the delivery costs of Credit Card Issuer
and avoid a lot of misinformation and deception. Due to the internet,
together with more traditional media (newspapers, radio and TV), there are ample media
options available to Credit Card Issuers to advertise their own Credit Cards.
"Brian Cole, of Capital One in the UK, the bank that first introduced
zero-interest balance transfers to Britain in the 90s, says: "There's a lot
of practice in the [banking] marketplace that is shameful, and credit card
companies are not immune. [Balance transfer] customers think they're going
to progress in getting out of debt, and get some relief from interest
payments. But make a mistake and you will end up making money for your
credit card company."
"CBA's head of retail banking services, Matt Comyn,
claimed it had never offered zero rates on balance transfers because it
could become a "debt trap" for customers.
"We view that such arrangements are not the right thing to offer our
customers," he said"
Commonwealth Bank said zero per cent balance transfers
should be banned
and mandatory minimum repayments of interest and principal should be imposed for
card holders of up to 2.5 per cent.
NAB question CBA's motives
However, NAB – which has the smallest credit card market share of the major
banks at 10.5 per cent – told the same hearing 0 per cent balance
transfers helped competition and questioned the motives of CBA as the dominant
credit card issuer with about a quarter of the market.
Mr Comyn denied the bank's enthusiasm for banning zero per cent balance
transfers was more about reducing the ability of competitors to take its
customers. He said CBA competed on other features, including technological
innovation such as giving customers the ability to block overseas transactions."
"For instance, the number of cards that offer a balance transfer at an interest
rate of zero have more than doubled in the past year, Finder.com.au reports."
Credit card companies just
love to advertise low or no interest rates for debts transferred from other
cards, purportedly to help you get
out of debt. But it's really a ruse to bring new customers on board and get
them paying interest down the road.
The interest rate applying to
the balance transfer generally ranges from 0% to 5%, for a period of four
months up to as long as it takes you to repay the debt. It can seem like an
offer too good to refuse.
One big thing to bear in
mind, though, is that the low-interest or no-interest offer generally
applies to the amount you transfer over from another card only – not to any
new purchases with your new card – and you will likely be charged a fee
based on the amount you're transferring, one that can go as high as 3%
(meaning you would pay $30 to transfer over $1000 and $300 to transfer over
$10,000).
The longer the interest-free
period, the higher the balance transfer fee.
Switching to a no-interest or
low-interest balance transfer credit card can be a good way to get a handle
on your debt or to avoid making repayments for a certain period of time.
But for the unsuspecting or
undisciplined, balance transfer cards can go terribly wrong.
And bear in mind that
flipping your debt to a low-interest or no-interest promo deal too often can
affect your credit rating, as can having multiple credit card applications
rejected.
The top five balance transfer credit card
traps
1. The 'payment hierarchy' con
When you make repayments,
they're firstly applied to the balance transfer amount – even if the card
has a 0% interest rate, and even if other purchases and cash advances are
accumulating interest at higher rates. In other words, the credit card
people have rigged it so you'll end up paying as much interest as possible.
As one credit card provider
puts it: "Payments made to your credit card account are first applied to any
amounts transferred from other credit cards, charge cards or store cards
under this promotion, before they are applied to any other purchase or cash
advance amount. This means that the portion of your outstanding account
balance that is subject to a lower interest rate will be paid off first."
Katherine Lane, Principal
Solicitor with the Consumer Credit Legal Centre in NSW, told us this payment
hierarchy technique "is a trick most often used in interest-free deals to
trigger interest being charged. It is completely unfair."
2. High interest on
new transactions
After you transfer your debt
to a low-interest card, any new transactions you make usually attract
interest immediately at the standard rate, which is invariably much higher
than the low introductory rate. You may have no interest-free period with
such transactions.
As one 2.9% balance transfer
card disclaimer puts it:
"Any
transactions made other than with this offer are at the standard Credit Card
rate, currently 20.39% pa."
Another disclaimer says: "You
will not gain the benefit of the interest free period on credit purchases
until the full balance (including any balance transfer and any other
promotional amount) is paid by the statement due date each month."
3. Luring you into a bad deal
The balance transfer might
simply be the hook that lures you into a card that's otherwise poor value in
terms of fees and standard interest rates. Many have standard annual
interest rates close to 20% or even higher that will kick in after the
introductory, or teaser, rate comes to a close.
4. Percentage fees
A fee may apply to transfer the
balance. The fine print of one balance transfer card puts it nicely: "A 1%
Balance Transfer Handling Fee to a maximum of $50 applies to each balance
transferred." If you're transferring a lot of debt, that can really add up.
And 3% fees are not uncommon, especially with longer interest-free offers.
5. Double trouble
You might be tempted to keep
spending on the old credit card, increasing your debt problems and creating
even bigger debt repayments. We recommend cutting up the old card.
"A senate inquiry submission by Treasury noted that in 2013 only 30% of surveyed
users reported paying interest on their credit card balance.98
. Contrary to this
self-reporting though, the share of balances attracting interest at the time was in fact closer to two-thirds.99"
Will
the Royal Commission recommend to the Governor of the Reserve Bank that it provide to
the House of Representatives in the
Commonwealth Parliament an annual written
'Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy' which includes, inter alia -
A. an annual written 'Report on the
Profitability of Credit Cards'; and
B. certifies that Visa and MasterCard separately
complied with the two weighted-aver
1.
Chapter 8
explains
that
U.S. Federal Reserve has provided an
annual written report to the U.S. Congress on
the Profitability of Credit Card Operations of
"large U.S. Credit Card banks"
for the last
26 years.
The Reserve Bank's webpage "Accountability"
provides a section titled 'Accountability to Parliament' which notes that the
Governor has provided to the Commonwealth Parliament a Statement on the
Conduct of Monetary Policy every few
years since 1996.
(i) the
weighted-average benchmark
for Visa/MasterCard Credit Cards -
(A) of 0.50
per cent will be maintained;
(B) will be
supplemented by a ceiling (on individual interchange
rates) of 0.80 per cent;
(ii) to prevent Interchange Fees drifting
upwards in the manner that they have previously,
compliance with the benchmark will be observed quarterly
rather than every three years.
Visa or MasterCard
will be required to reset its interchange schedule in
the event that its average interchange fee over the
previous four-quarter period exceeds the benchmark.
(iv) the
new interchange
benchmarks would take effect from 1 July 2017.
gather information from payment system participants and operators" by requesting each of the Four Pillars
to provide (to the Reserve Bank) data of their combined Credit Card Products for the
financial year ended 30 June 2018 which enables the Reserve Bank to present to the
Australian Parliament by 30 June 2019 an annual written Statement on the Conduct of
Monetary Policy
which inter alia
reports on the aggregate Profitability of Credit Card Operations of the
Four Pillarsthat
-
(i) provides
same
style 'pie charts' for "Card Issuers'
Revenue" [that quantifies at least seven revenue sources] and "Card Issuers'
Costs" [that quantifies at least five costs, which include Rewards Programs] that is displayed in
in Chapter 8;
(iii) certifies that Visa and
MasterCard separately complied with the two
weighted-average benchmarks
set out in (i)(A) and (i)(B) above during the previous four quarterly reporting
periods?
What has the
Reserve Bank done, and when did it do it, to ensure that Credit Card Issuers
do not issue further Credit
Cards to applicants that are
experiencing
Extreme Financial And Emotional Distress?
(ii) financial
quanta (quantums)
of that distress;
(iii) evidence of that
distress and
(iv) categories of
numbers of Credit Cards held by these distressed
Credit Cardholders?
What has the Reserve Bank actioned, and when did it action, to
ensure that Credit Card Issuers do not issue additional Credit Cards to applicants that are
experiencingExtreme Financial And Emotional Distressdue to already having been issued
with
several Credit Cards?
Has the Reserve Bank established a uniform credit evaluation
methodology that all Credit Card Issuers must observe similar to NAB's Microenterprise Loans because too many Australian adults are obtaining Credit Cards
with excessive interest rates which would be lower if the defaults were lower
if a robust designated credit analysis methodology that all Credit Card Issuers
observed was in place?
(d) that this problem of Credit Cardholders that are already
experiencingExtreme Financial And Emotional Distress
obtaining more Credit Cards which exacerbate their distress, dates back at least
20 years.
"Queensland is the host
state and custodian of the national consumer credit regulatory regime.It is also the home
base of some of the worst financial scams and unscrupulous market conduct in
the country. Many of these scams spread south and west much faster than the
cane toad has so far been able."
"A key responsibility the financial counselling community shoulders in
responding to its client base is to ensure the experiences those people
report are recorded and appropriately considered in service design and policy, social action
and law reform activities. Sadly, the otherwise rich data pool that the
450 odd financial counsellors working around Australia have access to, is also
fragmented. Representatives from the Commonwealth Financial Counselling Program
are here today. I congratulate them on evolving efforts to collect and produce
more useful data. The conversation around data collection and usage does require
greater engagement with and of the financial counselling community and all of
the various funding sources around the country."
Will the
Royal Commission recommend that the Reserve Bank set a new Standard, pursuant to Division 4, Section 18,
that requires all Credit Card Issuers to issue a 'Provisional' Charge
Card to any applicant that has not previously held a Credit
Card. Any such applicant, invariably school leavers, needs to
repay the
Closing Balance by the
Payment Due Date for a minimum of six months, prior to being issued with
a Credit Card.
Credit card issuers are banned from issuing credit cards to anyone
under 21, unless they have adult co-signers on the accounts or can
show proof
they have enough income
to repay the card debt. Credit card companies must stay at least
1,000 feet
from college campuses
if they are offering free pizza or other gifts to entice students to
apply for credit cards.
(b)
learning from point 1. of CBA's research in Section 4, set an 'Access Regime'
that each
credit card issued in Australia to a person who has
not previously owned a credit card be a Provisional Charge Card,
hereinafter PCC, with a conservative credit limit where the owner of the
PCC is required for the initial 12 months to repay the
outstanding balance on the PCC in full by the due date (9 days from the Issue
Date and 7 days from the normal receipt date for postal delivery) or be subject to severe late fees and restrictions on future
PCC use,
with
deferment of receiving a traditional credit card until the PCC owner complies with the PCC
repayment obligations for 12 months without breach.
"This paper argues that the role for government should be much
greater than the mere provision of additional information to consumers. In short,
government should ensure that banks behave in ways that are consistent with
the public interest, rather than ‘leaving it to the market’."
The reality is that government did
"....ensure that banks behave in ways that are consistent with the public
interest."
Parliament has enacted by statutes
Three Financial Regulatorsthrough the three
Parliament Acts. Alas, those three regulators have
not had the integrity to produce Minutes of their quarterly meetings because
with regard to Credit Cards, in particular
Unconscionable Credit Card Advertising,
they have been complicity with the financial entities they are decreed to
regulate
"to
act in the public interest".
ASIC and the RBA in particular have failed in their
Statutory DutytoFinancially Uneducated And Vulnerable
Credit Cardholders to the financial benefit of
Financially Literate
Credit Cardholders like the Writer.
(A) report annually
to the Australian Parliament on each of the
Four Pillars
Net Revenue and Net Costs break-up of their cumulative
Credit Card Products;
and
(B) report annually
to the Australian Parliament whether any Credit Card
Issuer/s is -