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Inherent in the Principal-Agent Relationship is the understanding that the
Agent will act for and on behalf of the Principal (which may be more than one
entity, person or company).
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The Agent assumes an
obligation of loyalty to the Principal that the Agent will neither intentionally, nor negligently, act improperly.
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An Agent cannot take personal advantage of the
business opportunities the agency position uncovers.
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A Principal, in turn, reposes trust and confidence in its/their Agent.
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These obligations bring forth a
fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence between the Principal and the
Agent.
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An Agent must obey reasonable instructions given by the Principal.
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The Agent must not do
acts that have not been expressly or impliedly authorized by the Principal.
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The Agent must
use reasonable care and skill in performing its duties.
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The Agent
must be loyal to the Principal/s.
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The Agent must refrain from putting itself in a position
that would ordinarily encourage a conflict between the Agent’s own interests and
those of the Principal/s.
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The Agent must keep the Principal/s informed as to all facts that materially
affect the Principal-Agent Relationship.
"The introduction of the
Single Responsible Entity ("SRE") into the Managed Investment Act 1998
("MIA") was designed to improve investor protection from the shortcomings of
the less regulated prescribed interest regime. This paper argues that the
structure and perceived merits of the SRE is fundamentally flawed on the
grounds that the principal–agent problem in the Managed Investment Scheme
("MIS") does not improve investor protection. While the efficient legal
structure and benefits of the SRE were evident during the design and
drafting of legislation, the true costs borne by investors were not clearly
recognised until the recent investment market downturn.
In light of the inherent weaknesses in the current structure of Responsible
Entity legislation via the MIA, several minor and major policy
recommendations have been proposed to improve investor protection by
reducing principal–agent conflicts within investment structures.
Policymakers must ensure that legislative reform is carefully drafted in
order to address the principal–agent conflicts in the MIA without creating
new negative effects or distortions in other areas of MIS legislation."