Report 2 - January 2019 189

It is a truism to say that if a society is to flourish and grow it needs quality, affordable infrastructure that is properly planned, built to high standards and delivered in a timely way. To ensure that this is done so the benefits of such large investments are shared by all, it falls to governments to show leadership in planning and managing infrastructure development. That is not to say that government must do everything itself. However, it is the government that must be held accountable for the what, how and when of these developments.

The CSELR project will go down in NSW history as one of the examples, par excellence, of how not to build infrastructure. This is not a partisan political statement. In the November 2016 Audit Office of New South Wales report it said on page 2:

"The CSELR project suffered many of the same problems we reported for WestConnex, Large construction projects and the Albert ‘Tibby’ Cotter Walkway."

and further

"As a result, between 2011 and 2014, TfNSW did not effectively plan and procure the CSELR project to ensure it maximised value for money for New South Wales."

In truth, as far as this project is concerned, since its announcement, matters have only gone from bad to worse to disastrous. It is just incongruous that at the time of finalising this report (January 2019) the answers to the largest questions regarding this project are still up in the air;
1.    when will it be completed?;
2.    what will be the travel times?; and
3.    how much is it going to cost?

Furthermore, how is all the co-lateral damage that has been done to businesses, particularly small businesses and residents along or near the light rail lines going to be satisfactorily resolved?

In our view the content, findings and recommendations of this report could and should have been far stronger and robust. As Opposition members on this inquiry, we encourage all to read the Minutes of the deliberative meeting held on 22nd January 2019. They are appended to the report. It is our view that those Opposition amendments that were not carried should have been endorsed. If they had been, it is our opinion that this report would stand as a far more rigorous critique of the CSELR project.

A key cause of the ongoing distress to residents and businesses has been the significant and lengthy delays of the CSELR project.

Construction on the project commenced in October 2015 and the final zone was to be completed by December 2017. Most zones were projected to be completed within six to nine months. A table of the proposed construction dates appears at Appendix 2 of the report. Not one of these completion dates were met.

Conflicting dates of when the project will now be completed were provided to the committee. The Secretary of Transport informed the committee in November 2018 that there was still 99 metres of track left to be laid. At a previous hearing, the committee was informed that testing on the track would take six  months. The Secretary for Transport also advised at the final hearing of the committee that he did not know when the project would be completed or how much it would cost.

The lack of certainty, in particular for businesses, was devastating for their finances, but also for the mental health of the owners.

The distress and suffering as a result of the delays has been exacerbated by poor communication to the residents and businesses and the sluggish response from the NSW Government, including the department. Indeed, the inquiry heard that at the initial meetings with businesses about the project, one Transport for NSW employee told business owners to "go on a holiday to Bali" for six months while construction was underway.

We believe that the support for businesses was inadequate, especially considering the delays that plagued the project. Furthermore, we are concerned that support for businesses was not forthcoming when delays were first identified. It was not until media reports of financial distress became common that the NSW Government provided meaningful support. Even then, the committee heard that the scheme was difficult to access, and there was no support for businesses who had already been forced to close or go into liquidation.

We strongly believe that it is not acceptable for governments to assume or accept as a default position that delays, particularly long delays, are necessarily a feature of infrastructure building programs. To adopt such an assumption, or accept this as a default position, virtually normalises the expectations of all parties related with the project that delays associated with its completion are ‘just the way it is’. The truth is, that when there are delays, somebody has to pay for them.

Indeed, by accepting delays as inevitable, it sends the message to the private sector that the government will not hold them accountable for their failures to deliver a project.

We find it particularly concerning that in January 2019, six years and two months after the project was publicly announced by the former Premier, Barry O’Farrell, and Minister for Transport and now current Premier, Gladys Berejiklian, it is still not possible to obtain from the NSW Government, an accurate figure of what the CSELR project is going to cost the state. We find this alarming, because if the NSW Government cannot confirm an accurate figure, nobody else can.

Given the total contingency fund for the CSELR project has been exhausted, it is likely that the cost of the project will continue to climb. Although we do not take a position on the dispute between Transport for NSW and its contractors, we are alarmed that the agency ultimately responsible was unable to prevent this disaster. The delays and contractor dispute leads us to find that the project has been mismanaged.