1.   Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project cost double the initial provision/construction forecast and took a year longer than predicted with lengthy disruptions to local small businesses that successfully litigated the NSW Govt due to lost sales

The Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project involved constructing a 12km, 19 stops, light rail service from adjacent to Circular Quay Station along George Street passing Wynyard and Town Hall stations to outside Central Railway Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then branching to:

  • Randwick via Alison Road and High Street  - L2. or
  • Kingsford via Anzac Parade  -  L3

Conventional trains have run between Circular Quay station and Central station for eons of Sydney's history (since 1964) that adequately satisfied patronage demands.  Why did TfNSW duplicate that existing train service over the 3.5km from Circular Quay station passing by Wynyard station, and Town Hall station to outside Central Railway station?  Simply, why did TfNSW build a parallel, juxtaposed train line that involved one of Sydney's most famous roads, namely George St Sydney, being lost to NSW Govt buses? 

 

 

 

Whatever Cost-Benefit Analysis that TfNSW undertook failed to identify that beneath George St was ladened with vital functioning utilities (ostensibly electricity cables but also water, sewerage, drainage, gas) that needed to be relocated.  Prima facie, the cost to lay tram tracks adjacent to the existing train lines between Circular Quay station and Central Railway station was $1,000,000,000 circa.  (For those non-mathematical, a billion dollars is one thousand million dollars.) 

“It’s a toy,” the former chief executive of Infrastructure NSW, Paul Broad, declared of the tram line he had campaigned against in government.  On 3 June 2019, TfNSW settled a claim by ALTRAC Light Rail (the operating company responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining CSELR) of misleading or deceptive conduct due to the manor/detail that TfNSW failed to provide information on how to manage electricity cables under George Street.  TfNSW agreed to provide ALTRAC an additional $576,000,000

Back in Nov 2013 the NSW Government announced the business case details for CLSER, with an estimated cost of $1.6 billion, and purportedly almost $4 billion worth of benefits.  The NSW Auditor-General Report dated 11 June 2020 estimated total cost to be $3.147 billion - virtually double the original cost forecast as in November 2013, the project business case summary estimated the CSELR would cost $1.6 billion.  Legal battles cost NSW Govt to settle with the Spanish contractor, Acciona, a additional $576 million. CSELR was completed a year late causing significant traffic disruption to businesses and residents $60 million for the small business assistance package due to extended disruption.  Refer History of CSELR cost increases and construction delays

The 120 tonnes CSELR trams are 67 metres long - amongst the longest trams in the world and almost four times as long as a bendy bus. Consequently, there are less than half the light rail station stops that were provided by previous Govt buses. Hence, passengers walk further to their final destination on their way to work and walk further from their office to catch a light rail on their journey home during late afternoon.

The Writer estimates that even before COVID, under TfNSW slogan, Turn Up and Go, over 80% of daily CSELR tram trips were less than 20% occupied and that the frequency of these lengthy trams were double what was required across each working day.  Yet even under COVID, TfNSW failed to materially reduce the frequency of services. Creditworthy investigations, from within Australia, the USA and Europe, on the relative cost-effectiveness of buses/light rail/heavy rail, conclude that buses are more frequent, materially cheaper and more flexible to tailoring to public transport demands.

Materially cheaper demand responsive transportation modes for the CBD South East Light Rail (CSELR) were available, most notably diesel and/or electric buses that -

i)       run on 'rubber tyres';

ii)      did not necessitate closing off George Street Sydney to Govt buses because of tram tracks with external electricity overhead cables or a third tram rail; and

iii)     whose supply frequency can be readily tailored according to passenger demand, eg. the impact of COVID.

Casual empiricism suggests that public transport usage (over the next 50 years) between both Randwick and Kingsford to/from Central Railway station, and onto Circular Quay, could have been provided for 10% circa of the $3.147 billion tram set, plus 50 years of the 120 tonnes, 67 metres longlight rail operating costs, had George St been restricted to Govt diesel or electric buses (not inflicted with a light rail network). Significantly, unlike trams, electric buses do not require external electricity supply.

 

 

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